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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOANNA MITCHELL, individually 
and JOANNA MITCHELL, personal 
representative of the estate 
of Jerry Mitchell, deceased, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Estate of JERRY L. RICE and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant JoAnna Mitchell, individually and Joanna 
Mitchell, personal representative of the estate of Jerry Mitchell, 
deceased, respectfully submits her reply brief in the appeal 
proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT PROPER BECAUSE RICE WAS AN INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR OF MITCHELL. 
The parties agree on the appropriate legal standard by 
which to assess Rice's relationship with Mitchell. Nevertheless, 
the application of the undisputed legal standards to this case show 
that Rice was not, as a matter of law, an employee of Mitchell. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42(2)(b) defines an 
uouri: or Appeals NO. yjuzyo 
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Priority No. 15 
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independent contractor as: 
any person engaged in the performance of any 
work for another who, while so engaged, is 
independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work, is not 
subject to the rule or control of the 
employer, is engaged only in the performance 
of a definite job or piece of work, and is 
subordinate to the employer only in effecting 
a result in accordance with the employer's 
design. 
Rice's relationship with Mitchell falls squarely within 
the definition of independent contractor set forth above. Rice was 
subordinate to Mitchell "only in effecting a result in accordance 
with the employer's design." The appellee attempts to minimize the 
independence of Rice by characterizing Rice as a "less than perfect 
employee." (Brief of Appellee, p. 14). This characterization 
misses the point that the reason Rice acted the way he did was 
because he was an independent contractor. The result Rice had to 
achieve in his work with Mitchell was the delivery of goods to a 
specific location. Any independent contractor would have to comply 
with this type of delivery requirement. This does not make all 
truck drivers employees of companies for whom they drive. A more 
realistic way of viewing the relationship between Mitchell and Rice 
is to assess what degree of discretion that could be exercised, and 
then, whether such discretion was in fact exercised. In fact, a 
case cited by appellee recognizes the difficulty of employing the 
traditional independent contractor vs. employee test in the context 
of truck driving. "Since the factor of actual control of details, 
often relied upon by the courts in resolving this same issue, is 
not likely to be helpful here, the importance of other tests, such 
as power of termination and method of payment, is magnified." 
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Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, Inc.f 602 P.2d 195, 199 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1979). Appellant submits that this Court should focus on 
the degree of control exercised by Rice in a context that was not 
already predetermined by the nature of the job. These factors 
indicate that where discretion was permissible, Rice exercised an 
equal amount of discretion as did Mitchell. 
The appellant, Mitchell, established in the proceedings 
at the trial court that Rice would engage in runs whenever he felt 
like it. When he would accept a run, he would exercise as much 
control or discretion as it was possible for a truck driver to 
exercise. Specifically, Rice would determine where, when and for 
how long to stop. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6) . These facts were not 
contested by the appellee and are directly contrary to appellee's 
contention that "Mr Rice had no discretion on how to operate the 
vehicle." (Brief of Appellee, p. 17). The Utah Supreme Court 
noted that the fact an employee worked at his convenience was 
relevant to the Court's holding that the worker in that case was an 
independent contractor and not an employee. English v. Kienke, 848 
P.2d 153, 158 (Utah 1993). Although the Kienke decision is 
distinguishable in other respects, the Court did find the worker's 
discretion as to when he would work relevant to its finding that 
the worker was an independent contractor and not an employee. 
The appellee makes an erroneous factual assumption when 
he states that when Rice "did drive[,] he was not allowed simply to 
take the vehicle and then be paid on his return by Mitchell." 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 14) . In contrast, the appellant has cited to 
the record in her statement of facts that "Jerry Rice would 
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sometimes use Jerry Mitchell's truck to perform runs for Logistics 
Express by himself." (Appellant's Brief, p. 6 citing p. 200 of the 
record). This is yet another factor compelling the conclusion that 
Rice was an independent contractor of Mitchell. 
Finally, the appellee contends in his brief that "the 
fact that the owner of the vehicle is in the truck shows he has a 
right to control the vehicle." (Brief of Appellee, p. 14). 
Although the appellee suggests that this contention finds support 
in Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P. 2d 926 (Utah 1980) 
appellant can find no such reference. The accident in Kinne 
addressed an accident in which the owner of the vehicle was not 
present. The mere presence or absence of the owner of a vehicle 
cannot change the legal relationship of the parties. Instead, 
courts typically look to the underlying facts and circumstances 
surrounding the disputed relationship in determining the character 
of that relationship. In the instant case, the weight of the 
evidence suggests Rice was an independent contractor of Mitchell. 
Judge Glasmann held that the facts as presented to him 
permitted only reasonable conclusion under the law; that Rice was 
an employee of Mitchell. However, the array of facts before Judge 
Glasmann do not lend themselves to only one reasonable conclusion. 
This, by itself, precludes summary judgment under Gourdin By and 
Through Close v. Scera. 845 P.2d 242 (Utah 1992). The appellant 
therefore asks that this case be remanded for a determination of 
the independent contractor issue. 
II. RICE IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
PROVISION, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-60. 
The appellee argues that Rice and Mitchell are statutory 
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co-employees and, therefore, Rice is immune from suit under Utah 
Code Annotated § 35-1-60, the exclusive remedy provision. Even if 
this Court characterizes Rice and Mitchell as statutory co-
employees, the estate of Jerry Rice is not entitled to the benefits 
of the exclusive remedy provision. In Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 
777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989) the Utah Supreme Court held that "a worker 
can sue a statutory employer who has not been required to pay 
workers compensation benefits and that the later does not partake 
of the immunity afforded by section 35-1-60." Bosch v. Busch 
Deve1opment, Inc., 777 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1989). Similarly, if a 
statutory employer, who remains contingently liable for workers 
compensation benefits cannot enjoy the immunity of the exclusive 
remedy provision, then a statutory co-employee, who will under no 
circumstances be liable for workers compensation benefits, cannot 
enjoy the immunity of Utah's exclusive remedy provision. 
In addition, the concept of a statutory employer was 
created by statute in order to allow a worker to recover workers 
compensation benefits from contractors who "retain supervision and 
control" over a worker. Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42(2). 
The category of statutory employer is entirely a creature of 
statute which serves the specific and narrow purpose of providing 
an alternative source for an injured worker to receive workers 
compensation benefits. There is no corollary classification of a 
statutory co-employee. There is, therefore, no discernable 
legislative intent that workers who have a common statutory 
employer are immune from suit and may take advantage of the 
exclusive remedy provision. 
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The appellee cites Harry L. Young & Sons. Inc. v. Ashton, 
538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975) in support of his contention that Mitchell 
was an employee of Logistics Express. In so arguing, the appellee 
now seeks to evade the effects of the lease agreement he relied on 
in arguing that Rice was an employee of Mitchell. Specifically, 
the lease agreement entered into between Logistics Express and 
Mitchell explicitly states that Mitchell is an independent 
contractor of Logistics Express and not an employee. While this 
factor, by itself, is not controlling under Harry L. Young & Sons, 
it is relevant to this Court's determination. In addition, 
Mitchell, unlike the driver in Harry L. Young & Sons owned his own 
truck and hence furnished his own equipment. Whether a worker 
furnishes his own equipment is relevant in determining whether a 
worker is an employee or an independent contractor. Id. at 318. 
Other factors cited by appellee, such as the fact that Mitchell had 
a Logex sign on his truck, are of minimal legal significance and 
cannot change the relationship between Mitchell and Logistics 
Express. 
Furthermore, Harry L. Young & Sons does not support the 
view that Rice was an employee of Logistics Express. The 
documentary evidence appellee relies upon explicitly states Rice is 
not an employee of Logistics Express. (Appellees Brief, p. 16). 
As little control as Mitchell had over Rice, Logistics Express had 
even less control over Rice. This fact alone compels the 
conclusion that Rice was not an employee of Logistics Express. 
The appellee cites three out-of-state cases which are 
distinguishable; Schell v. Navaio Freight Lines, Inc., 693 P. 2d 382 
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(Colo. App. 1984); Wilson v. Riley Whittle, Inc.. 701 P.2d 575 (Az. 
Ct. App. 1984) and Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, Inc., 602 
P.2d 195 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979). 
The first two cases, Schell and Wilson, both hold that a 
trucking company with an ICC permit may not hire independent 
contractor drivers and thereby evade tort liability to injured 
members of the public under 49 U.S.C. §11107. The Schell court 
explained that: 
The statute, which was enacted to prevent 
authorized interstate carriers from immunizing 
themselves from liability to the public, by 
leasing trucks from irresponsible third 
parties . . . Ici. at 384. 
Pursuant to this concern for the public "the ICC 
promulgated a regulatory scheme to effectuate Congress' intent to 
render carriers primarily liable to the public." Id. The effect 
of the ICC regulations is to hold companies such as Logex liable to 
members of the public for harm done by irresponsible truckers. The 
ICC regulations therefore eliminated the defense commonly raised by 
such trucking companies as Logex that it was immune from suit for 
the tortious acts of its drivers because those drivers were 
independent contractors. This defense was eliminated in a specific 
context; suits by injured members of the travelling public against 
truck companies. 
For example, the Schell case involved an injured member 
of the public and the negligence of a trucker operating under an 
ICC permit. In this context, the court found the trucker an 
employee of the trucking company. 
Similarly in Wilson, another member of the public was 
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injured when a truck driver negligently collided with another truck 
driver on a public road. Once again, in this context, the court 
would not hear the defense of the trucking company that the trucker 
was an independent contractor. For purposes of harm to the general 
public, the holder of the ICC permit was liable. The court noted 
that "[t]he federal statute and the federal regulations promulgated 
thereunder protect the motoring public by requiring the trucking 
company to have control of and to be responsible for the operation 
of the leased vehicles." Id. at 579. Further, the court noted 
that 49 U.S.C. § 11107 was enacted to "ensure that the motoring 
public was adequately protected." Id. at 578-79. 
Jerry Mitchell was not a member of the public and hence 
was not protected under the ICC regulations upon which the appellee 
relies. The trial court in the proceedings below came to this 
conclusion and dismissed Mitchell's suit against Logistics Express. 
Therefore the ICC regulations cited by appellee and case law 
interpreting these regulations are not relevant in assessing 
whether under state workers compensation law the exclusive remedy 
provision bars a negligence suit against a co-driver. Mitchell was 
a fellow driver, and not a member of the travelling public. 
Therefore, the Schell and Wilson cases do not (1) make Mitchell and 
Rice employees of Logex under Utah's Workers Compensation Act; and 
(2) do not make Mitchell and Rice statutory co-employees under 
Utah's Workers Compensation Act. 
Finally, in Matkins. two drivers worked for a trucking 
company who in turn, leased the truckers to a trucking company with 
a proper ICC permit. This case would be similar if Mitchell and 
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Rice had driven a truck of another company who in turn leased 
Mitchell and Rice out to Logex. Mitchell and Rice would clearly be 
employees in that context. However, the facts of this case are 
different. Mitchell owned his own vehicle. Rice worked with Logex 
through Mitchell. The company that was found to be the employer in 
Matkins "agreed to furnish a truck and two drivers" to the licensed 
ICC company. Id. at 196. In the instant case, no such company 
exists, and in the absence of such a company it cannot be said that 
Mitchell and Rice were employees of Logex. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment in this instance was improper because 
the evidence presented creates a material issue of fact as to 
whether Rice was an independent contractor of Mitchell or whether 
he was an employee. In addition, Mitchell and Rice were not co-
employees of Logex, either at common law or by statute. Further, 
even if they are characterized as statutory co-employees, such co-
employees are not entitled to the immunity provided under the 
exclusive remedy provision found in U.C.A. § 35-1-60. 
DATED this /l'"~ day of . \ ' > , ... . , 1994. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
- , : . . •'- ^
 x
 y ^ - y ••, ^ — 
PATRICK F. HOLDEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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